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Abstract
In multi-path routing schemes for payment-channel networks, Alice transfers funds
to Bob by splitting them into partial payments and routing them along multiple paths.
Undisclosed channel balances and mismatched transaction fees cause delays and failures
on some payment paths. For atomic transfer schemes, these straggling paths stall the
whole transfer. We show that the latency of transfers reduces when redundant payment
paths are added. This frees up liquidity in payment channels and hence increases the
throughput of the network. We devise Boomerang, a generic technique to be used
on top of multi-path routing schemes to construct redundant payment paths free of
counterparty risk. In our experiments, applying Boomerang to a baseline routing
scheme leads to 40 % latency reduction and 2x throughput increase. We build on ideas
from publicly verifiable secret sharing, such that Alice learns a secret of Bob iff Bob
overdraws funds from the redundant paths. Funds are forwarded using Boomerang
contracts, which allow Alice to revert the transfer iff she has learned Bob’s secret. We
implement the Boomerang contract in Bitcoin Script.
1. Introduction
1.1. Payment Channels and Networks
Blockchains provide a method for maintaining a distributed ledger in a decentralized and
trustless fashion [22]. However, these so called layer-1 (L1) consensus mechanisms suffer
from low throughput and high confirmation latency. From a scaling perspective it would
be desirable if transactions could be processed ‘locally’ by only the involved participants.
*Contributed equally and listed alphabetically.
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Payment channels (PCs) [6, 27, 5] provide this. Once two participants have established
a PC on-chain, they can transact through the channel off-chain without involving L1 every
time. Briefly, the mechanism underlying the different PC implementations is as follows.
The participants escrow a pool of funds on-chain which they can spend only jointly. They
can perform a transfer through the PC by agreeing on an updated split of the shared funds
which reflects the new balances after the transfer and can be enforced on-chain anytime.
Special care is taken that participants can only ever execute the most recent agreement
on-chain. PCs improve the throughput, latency and privacy of a blockchain system.
Payment networks (PNs) [27, 20, 8, 15, 9] can be constructed on top of PCs. PCs can
be linked to establish a path between a source and a destination via some intermediaries.
Hash- and time-locked contracts (HTLC) are used to perform transfers via intermediaries
without counterparty risk, giving rise to so called layer-2 (L2) PNs. To this end, the
destination draws a secret (preimage) and reveals a one-way function of the secret (preimage
challenge) to the source. The source then initiates a chain of payments to the destination,
all conditional on the revelation of a valid preimage. The destination reveals the secret
to claim the funds, setting the chain of payments in motion. Net, the destination is paid,
the source pays, and the intermediaries are in balance, up to a small service fee earned for
forwarding. For recent surveys on PCs and PNs, see [14, 12].
1.2. Routing in Payment Networks
Routing algorithms for PNs find paths and forward funds while optimizing objectives such
as throughput, latency, or transaction fees. Recently, the routing problem has been studied
extensively and various routing algorithms have been proposed [27, 28, 18, 29, 13, 32, 7, 33].
Early on, it has been discovered, also through the Lightning Torch experiment, that single-
path routing restricts the maximum transfer size.1 Multi-path routing [25] allows for a
more flexible use of PC liquidity and hence can accommodate larger transfers by splitting
transfers into partial payments that are routed along multiple paths. However, while
single-path payments are naturally atomic, i.e., they either succeed or fail entirely, simply
sending multiple partial payments can lead to half-way incomplete transfers. Atomicity is
important to keep payment networks manageable from a systems-design perspective, and is
achieved by atomic multi-path payments (AMP, [23]), which most state-of-the-art routing
algorithms rely on and Lightning developers are actively working towards.2 Yet, because
of its ‘everyone-waits-for-the-last’ philosophy, atomicity comes at a cost for latency and
throughput.
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Figure 1: The blue (resp. red) points mark the tradeoff between latency and throughput
of the baseline (resp. Boomerang) AMP routing scheme, obtained by varying an
internal parameter. The Pareto fronts (lines) and the achievable regions (shaded)
of the tradeoff are shown. Boomerang yields a 2x increase in throughput and a
40 % decrease in latency over the baseline scheme.
1.3. Main Contributions
Due to the stochastic nature of PNs, i.e., random delays and failures of payment paths,
AMP routing often idles while waiting for a few straggling paths. This leads to a long
time-to-completion (TTC) of transfers. Furthermore, already successful partial payments
are kept pending, seizing liquidity from the PN that could have served other transfers. As
a result, the throughput of the PN reduces. For example, consider a transfer from Alice to
Bob of $4 via 4 paths, of which 3 succeed after 1 s and 1 succeeds after 4 s. The transfer
has a TTC of 4 s and consumes liquidity $4 · 4 s = $16 · s.
Now suppose instead Alice could send 8 partial payments of $1 each (4 ‘extra’ redundant
paths), such that AMP completes once a quorum of 4 out of 8 paths succeeds and Bob
cannot steal any extra funds. If 6 paths succeed after 1 s and 2 succeed after 4 s, then the
transfer has a TTC of 1 s and consumes liquidity 4 · $1 · 1 s + 2 · $1 · 1 s + 2 · $1 · 4 s = $14 · s.
Thus, the use of redundant payments reduces the TTC of AMP transfers. As a result, less
liquidity is consumed and the PN achieves higher throughput. Similar observations about
straggler mitigation using redundancy have been made in large-scale distributed computing
[4, 16, 1].
We devise Boomerang, a technique to be used on top of multi-path routing schemes
to construct redundant payment paths free of counterparty risk. Building on ideas from
publicly verifiable secret sharing, we use a homomorphic one-way function to intertwine
1https://diar.co/volume-2-issue-25/#1 (Jun 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/
its-getting-harder-to-send-bitcoins-lightning-torch-heres-why (Mar 2019)
2https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/q/89475 (Jul 2019)
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the preimage challenges used for HTLC-type payment forwarding, such that Alice learns
a secret of Bob iff Bob overdraws funds from the redundant paths. Funds are forwarded
using Boomerang contracts, which allow Alice to revert the transfer iff she has learned Bob’s
secret. We prove the Boomerang construction to be secure, and present an implementation
in Bitcoin Script which applies either adaptor signatures based on Schnorr or ECDSA
signatures, or elliptic curve scalar multiplication as a one-way function.
We empirically verify the benefits of Boomerang for throughput and latency of AMP
routing. For this purpose, we choose a baseline routing scheme which resembles the scheme
currently used in Lightning. We enhance this scheme with Boomerang. As can be seen
in Fig. 1, redundancy increases the throughput by 2x and reduces the TTC (latency) by
40 %. Our results suggest that redundancy is a generic tool to boost the performance of
AMP routing algorithms.
1.4. Paper Outline
In Section 2, we recall cryptographic preliminaries, introduce the system model, and sum-
marize causes for delay and failure of transfers in payment networks. We devise the
Boomerang construction for redundant transactions in Section 3, and prove it to be se-
cure. An implementation of Boomerang in Bitcoin Script is presented in Section 4. In
Section 5, we demonstrate the utility of redundancy for improving routing protocols in
experiments.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. System Model & Terminology
The topology of a payment network (PN) is given by an undirected graph whose nodes
are agents, and whose edges are payment channels (PCs). Each PC endpoint owns a share
of the funds in the PC, which we refer to as its liquidity or balance. For privacy reasons
it is undesirable to reveal balances to third party nodes. Following Lightning [27, BOLT
#7], we assume that nodes have no information about PC balances when taking routing
decisions, but know the PN topology. Finally, we assume that PN nodes communicate in
a peer-to-peer (P2P) gossiping fashion only along PCs, i.e., PN topology is P2P network
topology.
For multi-path routing, we highlight a strict separation between two layers in our termi-
nology (cf. Fig. 2). The ‘logical’ layer is concerned with transfers (TFs) of an amount v of
funds from a source (Alice, A) to a destination (Bob, B). The ‘network’ layer implements
a TF through multiple transactions (TXs) from the sender to the receiver along different
paths through multiple intermediaries (Ingrid, Ii). A preimage pi is used for HTLC-type
forwarding of the i-th TX. The amounts of the TXs add up to the amount of the TF.
Routing algorithms schedule a sequence of TXs in an attempt to implement a given TF.
Figures of merit are throughput, i.e., the average amount of funds transported successfully
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Alice (A) Bob (B)
Ingrid (I(1)1 )
. . .
Ingrid (I(1)n1 )
Ingrid (I(v)1 )
. . .
Ingrid (I(v)nv )
...
...
v v
Network
Logical
Figure 2: The TF from A to B (dashed) is implemented by v TXs via intermediaries
(I(1)1 , . . . , I
(1)
n1 ), ..., (I
(v)
1 , . . . , I
(v)
nv ) (solid).
per time, and time-to-completion (TTC), i.e., the average delay between commencement
and completion of a TF.
2.2. Delay and Failure of Transactions in Payment Networks
There are various causes for delay and failure of TXs in PNs: a) The liquidity of a PC
along the desired path is insufficient. b) Insufficient fees do not incentivize intermediaries to
forward. c) Queuing, propagation and processing delay of P2P messages. d) PN topology
changes, nodes come and go, e.g., due to connectivity or maintenance. e) Governments or
businesses attempt to censor certain TFs.
2.3. Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly recapitulate the cryptographic tools used throughout the paper.
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q with a generator g ∈ G. We assume
that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP, formally introduced in SectionA) is hard for g
in G, which is commonly assumed to be the case, e.g., in certain elliptic curves (ECs) used
in Bitcoin.
Let H : Zq → G with H(x) , gx, where Zq is the finite field of integers modulo q. We
require H to be a one-way function, which follows from the DLP hardness assumption.
Given a preimage challenge h , H(x), it is difficult to obtain the preimage x, but easy to
check whether a purported preimage xˆ satisfies the challenge (i.e., H(xˆ) = h).
H has the following homomorphic property which we make extensive use of:
∀n ≥ 1: ∀c1, . . . , cn : H
(
n∑
i=1
cixi
)
=
n∏
i=1
H(xi)ci (1)
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Figure 3: The TF of amount v from A to B is implemented by the first v out of w , v+ u
TXs of unit amount $1 via (I(1)1 , . . . , I
(1)
n1 ), ..., (I
(w)
1 , . . . , I
(w)
nw ).
3. The Boomerang Construction
In this section, we show how to add redundant TXs without counterparty risk. To this
end, we build up the Boomerang construction in three steps. First, B draws a secret
α0. We use the homomorphic property of H and ideas from publicly verifiable secret
sharing [31, 2, 11, 24, 30] to construct the preimages pi and the preimage challenges H(pi)
such that A learns α0 iff B overdraws funds from the redundant paths. Second, the so
called Boomerang contract serves as a building block for contingent transfer of funds,
i.e., HTLC-type forwarding with the additional provision that A can revert the TF iff
she learns α0. Finally, the end-to-end procedure of a Boomerang TF is devised from the
previously mentioned ingredients. Subsequently, we prove that Boomerang satisfies the
relevant notions of security.
3.1. Setup of Preimage Challenges
We assume that A and B have agreed out-of-band to partition their TF into v TXs of a unit
of funds ($1) each, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.). In addition, they use u redundant
TXs to improve their TF, so that the total number of TXs is w , v+u (cf. Fig. 3). First, B
chooses a polynomial P (x) of degree deg(P ) = v with coefficients α0 R←− Zq, . . . , αv R←− Zq
drawn uniformly at random,
P (x) =
v∑
j=0
αjx
j . (2)
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Party 1 (P1) Party 2 (P2)
$1 + δ : pˆi s.t. H(pˆi) = H(pi)
$1 : pˆi s.t. H(pˆi) = H(pi)
αˆ0 s.t. H(αˆ0) = H(α0)
Figure 4: Boomerang contract used to forward $1 plus δ TX fees from P1 to P2
Then, B commits to P (x) by providing A withH(α0), . . . ,H(αv). Due to the homomorphic
property of H, eq. (1), A can compute
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , v, . . . , w} : H(P (i)) = H
 v∑
j=0
αji
j
 = v∏
j=0
H(αj)(i
j). (3)
For the i-th TX, pi , P (i) is used as a preimage for HTLC-type forwarding. Hence, A uses
H(pi) = H(P (i)) from eq. (3) as preimage challenge, and informs B out-of-band of which
i was used.
To redeem the i-th TX, B reveals pi = P (i). Should B overdraw by revealing more than
v evaluations pi of P (x), then α0, . . . , αv can be recovered using polynomial interpolation
due to deg(P ) = v. Recall that α0 serves as a secret which A can use to revert the TF
in this case. As long as B reveals no more than v evaluations of P (x), each αi remains
marginally uniformly distributed. In this case, the TF is final.
Note that A and B do not have to agree on u ahead of time. Instead, A can create
virtually infinitely many H(pi) (as long as w < q), and hence send a continuous flow of
TXs until B redeems v TXs. This property is similar to rateless codes used to implement
‘digital fountains’ [3], and enables B to choose u adaptively during execution of the TF.
Furthermore, since there is no risk in ‘losing control’ over a redundant TX, source routing
can be abandoned in favor of the PN taking distributed routing decisions. Conceptually,
the use of redundant TXs in PNs is analogous to the use of erasure-correcting codes [10]
in communication networks consisting of packet erasure channels [17] and for straggler
mitigation in large-scale distributed computing and storage [4, 16].
3.2. Boomerang Contract
We devise the Boomerang contract, which implements reversible HTLC-type forwarding
as required for Boomerang on top of a PC. Still, w.l.o.g. $1 funds and δ TX fee are to be
forwarded from party P1 to party P2.
Conceptually, the desired behavior could be accomplished by two conditional forwardings
(cf. Fig. 4), the first of which (‘forward’, top arrow in Fig. 4) transfers $1 + δ from P1 to
P2 upon revelation of a preimage pˆi such that H(pˆi) = H(pi), and the second of which
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$1
P2 reveals pˆi s.t.
H(pˆi) = H(pi)
within t ∈ [T0, T0+∆fwd]
P1 reveals αˆ0 s.t.
H(αˆ0) = H(α0)
within t ∈ [T0, T0+∆rev]
P1
P2
P1
yes
no
no
yes
(a)
δ
P2 reveals pˆi s.t.
H(pˆi) = H(pi)
within t ∈ [T0, T0+∆fwd]
P1
P2
no
yes
(b)
Figure 5: Flow charts for payout of a Boomerang contract (cf. Fig. 4) concerning (a) $1
funds and (b) δ TX fees between P1 and P2
(‘reverse’, bottom arrow in Fig. 4) transfers $1 back from P2 to P1 upon revelation of two
preimages pˆi and αˆ0 such that H(pˆi) = H(pi) and H(αˆ0) = H(α0). Note that the two
conditions are nested such that if P1 redeems the second forwarding, then P2 can redeem
the first forwarding. As a result, the Boomerang contract has three possible outcomes.
Either, a) neither forwarding is redeemed and P1 retains all funds (e.g., in the case of
a timeout or an unused redundant TX), or b) only the ‘forward’ forwarding is redeemed
(i.e., B draws funds by revealing P (i) but does not leak α0), or c) both forwardings are
redeemed (i.e., B overdraws and reveals both P (i) and α0). Anyway, P2 cannot loose funds
and thus agrees to deploy the contract on the PC.
Note that Fig. 4 has been simplified for ease of exposition. Indeed, two essential aspects
are not captured in Fig. 4 and necessitate the refined final specification of the Boomerang
contract in Fig. 5. First, timeouts ∆fwd and ∆rev (relative to current time T0) need to
be chosen such that the source of the TF has time to detect overdraw and reclaim the
funds (∆fwd < ∆rev). Second, having two separate forwardings would requisition twice the
liquidity ($2 + δ) while the forwardings are pending. Instead, the Boomerang contract as
specified by the flow charts in Fig. 5 allows for consistent timeouts with ∆fwd < ∆rev and
requisitions the TX amount in PC liquidity only once ($1+δ). We present an implementa-
tion of Fig. 5 in Bitcoin Script on top of Eltoo PCs [5] in Section 4. Throughout the paper,
we use two circular arrows as in Fig. 4 to visualize a Boomerang contract.
3.3. End-To-End Procedure for Boomerang Transfers
Given the intertwined preimage challenges of Section 3.1 and the Boomerang contract of
Section 3.2, we devise the end-to-end procedure for Boomerang TFs.
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A I1 I2 B
T0 + 3 ·∆T T0 + 2 ·∆T T0 + 1 ·∆T
T0 + 6 ·∆TT0 + 5 ·∆TT0 + 4 ·∆T
Propagation of preimage pˆi
Propagation of funds or of preimage αˆ0
Figure 6: Staggering of timeouts of Boomerang contracts: The ∆fwd are chosen such that
propagation of the preimage pˆi from B via I2 and I1 to A is guaranteed once B
reveals pˆi. The ∆rev are chosen such that propagation of the preimage αˆ0 from
A via I1 and I2 to B is guaranteed once A reveals αˆ0.
TX
1
2
3
4
5
1 Promise 2 Deliver 3 Cancel 4 Finish
Figure 7: Stages of a Boomerang TF (here using w = v+u = 2 + 3 TXs, each through two
Ii): 1 A attempts 5 TXs; TXs 1, 2 and 5 reach B, 3 and 4 do not. 2 B claims
TXs 1 and 2 by revealing P (1) and P (2). 3 The unsuccessful and outstanding
TXs 3, 4 and 5 are cancelled upon request from B. 4 A relinquishes the option
to retract TXs 1 and 2 as no further funds can be drawn by B.
To forward a TX along a path from A to B via I1, . . . , In, the timeouts ∆fwd and ∆rev of
the Boomerang contracts between A and I1, Ii and Ii+1, and In and B need to be chosen in
the following way: The forward components’ timeouts decrease along the path from A to
B. The reverse components’ timeouts increase along the path from A to B. Additionally,
the earliest reverse component expires later than the latest forward component, to allow
A to react to overdraw and activate the reverse components. An example is illustrated in
Fig. 6.
A Boomerang TF of v units using w = v + u redundant TXs proceeds, after the setup
of preimage challenges out-of-band, in four steps (cf. Fig. 7):
1 Promise: A attempts w = v + u TXs.
2 Deliver: B claims funds from up to v TXs by revealing the preimages pi = P (i) to
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the corresponding preimage challenges H(pi), activating the forward components of
the Boomerang contracts along the respective paths.
3 Cancel: Upon a request by B which is passed on to the tip of the path of an
unsuccessful or surplus TX, outstanding TXs are cancelled. Note that cancellation
is counterparty risk-free if it proceeds along the path from B towards A, and honest
as well as rational participants have a self-interest in freeing up liquidity that will
foreseeably not earn TX fees.
4 Finish: A renounces the reverse components of the remaining Boomerang contracts
to free up liquidity, as there is no more risk of B overdrawing.
3.4. Security Guarantees
We give the following guarantees to the sourceA and the destinationB of a TF, respectively,
which formalize security for the outlined Boomerang construction:
Theorem 1 (A-Guarantee). If more than v of the redundant TXs are drawn from A, then
A can recover α0 and revert all TXs.
Theorem 2 (B-Guarantee). As long as B follows the protocol and draws no more than
v of the redundant TXs, all TXs are final, except with negligible probability, provided the
DLP is hard for (G, g).
Corollary 1 (Proofs). If A knows α0, this proves that B cheated. If A knows pi, this
proves that B was paid accordingly. A can forge the proofs only with negligible probability,
provided the DLP is hard for (G, g).
Note that ‘drawing’ a TX means ‘revealing the preimage pi = P (i) for the challenge
H(pi) of TX i’. Hence, the above guarantees are statements about ‘how much preimage
information flows’ ‘into A’ and ‘out of B’, implicitely assuming the worst-case that all
intermediary Ii collude with the respective opposing party.
Proof of Theorem 1: A-Guarantee. Due to the homomorphic property of H, and the fact
that A computes the challenges H(pi) from the commitments H(α0), . . . ,H(αv), there
exists a unique polynomial of degree v that passes through all P (i). This polynomial can
be determined by interpolation, if more than v preimages pi = P (i) are revealed. Hence,
in the case of overdrawing, A can be certain to obtain an α0, such that A can activate the
reverse components of the Boomerang contracts and revert all TXs.
Proof of Theorem 2: B-Guarantee. It suffices to show that one cannot recover α0 from
H(α0), ..., H(αv), P (i1), ..., P (iv), with i1, . . . , iv distinct, except with negligible proba-
bility, provided that the DLP is hard for (G, g).
W.l.o.g., assume that all preimages revealed by B have been forwarded to A. Call the
task A faces Alice’s problem (AP), i.e., given an AP instance (gα0 , . . . , gαv , P (i1), . . . , P (iv))
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for known distinct i1, . . . , iv, find α0. We show that AP is computationally infeasible by
reducing the DLP to AP.
The reduction proceeds as follows. Assume B is a blackbox that solves AP instances
efficiently. Using B, we construct a DLP solver A. Present A with a DLP instance (g, ga).
A samples P (ij) R←− Zq for j = 1, . . . , v uniformly at random, such that there exists a unique
degree v polynomial interpolating P (0), P (i1), . . . , P (iv), with coefficients α0, . . . , αv chosen
uniformly at random. Recall that P (0) = α0 = a is unknown. By eq. (2),
P (0)
P (i1)
...
P (iv)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,p
=

00 01 . . . 0v
i01 i
1
1 . . . i
v
1
...
...
...
i0v i
1
v . . . i
v
v

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,M

α0
α1
...
αv

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,α
, (4)
where the entries of M are fixed.
As M is a Vandermonde matrix and thus invertible,
p = Mα ⇐⇒ α = M−1p. (5)
Let m˜ij ,
{
M−1
}
ij
and pj , {p}j , where {X}y is the y-th entry of X. Then,
αi =
v∑
j=0
m˜ijpj . (6)
Hence, using the homomorphic property of H from eq. (1), obtain
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v} : H(αi) = H
 v∑
j=0
m˜ijpj
 = v∏
j=0
H(pj)m˜ij . (7)
Now, A has a tuple (H(α0), . . . ,H(αv), P (i1), . . . , P (iv)) drawn from the distribution of
AP instances implied by the Boomerang protocol. A invokes the AP oracle B and obtains
α0 = a, which solves the DLP instance.
Thus, an efficient solution to AP implies an efficient solution to DLP. But since DLP is
assumed to be hard, AP has to be hard, proving the claim.
Proof of Corollary 1: Proofs. Theorems 1 and 2 imply that A knows α0 iff B cheated
(except with negligible probability, provided the DLP is hard for (G, g)).
For pi to serve as proof of payment, it requires that for any n ≤ v and known distinct
i1, . . . , in+1, A cannot obtain P (in+1) from H(α0), ..., H(αv), P (i1), ..., P (in) (except with
negligible probability, provided the DLP is hard for (G, g)). For n = v, this follows from
Theorem 2 by contradiction, as α0 can be computed from P (i1), . . . , P (iv+1). For n < v,
the problem is harder than for n = v.
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4. Implementation in Bitcoin Script
We present an implementation of Boomerang in Bitcoin Script and its deployment on an
Eltoo PC. For simplicity, we first present an implementation which hinges on a new opcode
for H(x). Subsequently, we refine the implementation to apply adaptor signatures based
on Schnorr or ECDSA signatures instead.
4.1. Implementation Using an Opcode for H(x)
Assume the addition of a new command ECEXP〈g〉 to Bitcoin Script for computing H(x) =
gx ∈ G. The command would pop x off the stack and push gx back onto the stack. The
necessary cryptographic primitives to do this in ECs are already part of Bitcoin and only
need to be exposed to the scripting engine. Then, ECEXP〈g〉 can be used as a one-way func-
tion in similar situations as the SHA* or HASH* commands, but provides the homomorphic
property that can be necessary or useful for applications beyond Boomerang.
We show how the mechanics of the Boomerang contract specified in Fig. 5 can be im-
plemented using Bitcoin Script. To this end, we refer to the settlement transaction of the
PC on top of which the Boomerang contract is deployed as TXsettle, and to transactions
that Pi would use to pay a certain output to themselves as TXpayout,Pi . For the signature
scheme employed by Bitcoin, an identity P has a public key pkP and a private (secret) key
skP . Using skP , a signature σ , sigP (x) for string x can be created.
The implementation of Fig. 5(a) is provided in Fig. 8. The first condition of the flow
chart in Fig. 5(a), which captures the forward component of the Boomerang contract, is
implemented as an output of TXsettle. If this condition is met, the distribution of the funds
is decided by an additional transaction TXretaliate which implements the reverse component
of the Boomerang contract. TXretaliate is agreed-upon and signed by both parties using
temporary one-time identities Pi,tmp as part of the deployment of a Boomerang contract.
The implementation of Fig. 5(b) is provided in Fig. 11 of SectionB.
4.2. Implementation Using Adaptor Signatures
The dependency on a new opcode ECEXP〈g〉 can be lifted by replacing the hash-lock with
adaptor signatures [26] based on Schnorr signatures [19] or ECDSA signatures [21]. A
primer on adaptor signatures is given in SectionC. Rather than one party revealing a
preimage x for a challenge h , H(x) when publishing a TX to claim funds or advance a
contract, P1 and P2 exchange an adaptor signature σ′ for TX which either party can turn
into a proper signature σ once they obtain x. Once TX gets published together with σ,
the other party can derive x from σ and σ′.
4.3. Deployment of Boomerang on an Eltoo Payment Channel
Fig. 9 shows a Boomerang contract for the i-th TX with preimage challenge H(pi) deployed
on top of an Eltoo PC. Transactions and cryptographic identities belonging to Eltoo are
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Bitcoin Script implementation of output on TXsettle:
1 IF
2 ECEXP〈g〉 PUSH〈H(pi)〉 EQUALVERIFY
3 2 PUSH〈pkP1,tmp〉 PUSH〈pkP2,tmp〉 2 CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY
4 ELSE
5 PUSH〈T0 + ∆fwd〉 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP
6 PUSH〈pkP1〉 CHECKSIGVERIFY
7 ENDIF
Redemption for P1 (‘no’ branch):
1 sigP1(TXpayout,P1)
2 FALSE
Redemption for P2 (‘yes’ branch):
1 sigP1,tmp(TXretaliate)
2 sigP2,tmp(TXretaliate)
3 pˆi
4 TRUE
Bitcoin Script implementation of output on TXretaliate:
1 IF
2 ECEXP〈g〉 PUSH〈H(α0)〉 EQUALVERIFY
3 PUSH〈pkP1〉 CHECKSIGVERIFY
4 ELSE
5 PUSH〈T0 + ∆rev〉 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP
6 PUSH〈pkP2〉 CHECKSIGVERIFY
7 ENDIF
Redemption for P1 (‘yes’ branch):
1 sigP1(TXpayout,P1)
2 αˆ0
3 TRUE
Redemption for P2 (‘no’ branch):
1 sigP2(TXpayout,P2)
2 FALSE
Figure 8: Implementation of the $1 outputs (cf. Fig. 5(a)), and witness stacks for redemp-
tion, for the two staggered TXsettle and TXretaliate (cf. Fig. 9). For TXsettle: l. 2
enforces revelation of pˆi s.t. H(pˆi) = H(pi), l. 3 requires signatures of the tem-
porary identities Pi,tmp (created separately for each instance of the contract, and
used to sign TXretaliate as part of the commitment to a forwarding), l. 5 enforces
the timelock of T0 + ∆fwd, l. 6 requires a signature of P1. For TXretaliate: l. 2
enforces revelation of αˆ0 s.t. H(αˆ0) = H(α0), l. 3 requires a signature of P1, l. 5
enforces the timelock of T0 + ∆rev, l. 6 requires a signature of P2.
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Eltoo
Boomerang
...
TXel2update
P el21,u
P el22,u
TXel2settle
P el21,u , P
el2
2,u
P el21,s , P
el2
2,s
P el21,s
P el22,s
P1
P2
δ H(pi) P2
T0+∆fwd P1
TXboomretaliate
$1
H(pi) P boom1,tmp, P boom2,tmp
P (i)
P boom1,tmp
P boom2,tmp
T0+∆fwd P1
H(α0) P1
T0+∆rev P2
Figure 9: A Boomerang contract is deployed as outputs and a thereon depending TX on top
of the settlement mechanism of an Eltoo PC. (Legend: Boxes are Bitcoin trans-
actions, an arrow leaving/entering a box indicates an output/input, respectively,
labels along arrows indicate spending conditions, forks of arrows indicate alter-
native spending conditions, labels near TX inputs indicate redemption witnesses,
‘requires signature of’, ‘signed by’, ‘preimage challenge’, ‘preimage
solution’, ‘absolute time-lock’, ‘relative time-lock’.)
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marked with (.)el2, those belonging to Boomerang are marked with (.)boom. Fig. 9 also
illustrates Figs 11 and 8.
5. Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate Boomerang in a low-fidelity prototype implementation3 of the routing compo-
nents inspired by the testbed of Flash [33]. First, we outline our experimental setup, then
we specify the three contending schemes, and finally we present and discuss the observed
performance.
5.1. Experimental Setup
The PN topology is drawn from the Watts–Strogatz ensemble where initially N = 100
nodes in a regular ring lattice are connected to their 8 nearest neighbors, and subsequently
each initial edge is rewired randomly with probability 0.8. For each PC endpoint, its
initial liquidity is drawn log-uniformly in [log(100), log(1000)]. The topology is static and
known to all nodes; each PC’s balance is only known to the PC’s endpoints. 50000 TFs are
generated as follows. Source and destination are sampled uniformly from the N nodes. The
amounts are drawn from the Ripple dataset used in SpeedyMurmurs [29]. As in previous
works, each node has a backlog of TFs it attempts to route one by one. We report sample
mean and sample standard deviation of 10 PNs and TF traces.
Our implementation is a low-fidelity prototype of the routing and communications tasks.
An abstract PN protocol accommodates different routing schemes (cf. Flash [33]). A TX
takes place in two phases: First, in the Reserve phase, Boomerang contracts are set up
along a path from A to B if PC liquidity permits. A is notified whether Reserve was
successful. Second, in theRollback/Execute phase, the chain of Boomerang contracts is
either dismantled (Rollback) or the funds are delivered (Execute). An Abort message
can stop an ongoing Reserve attempt. Purely informational messages (e.g., outcome of
Reserve) are relayed without delay. Operations on the PC (e.g., deploying a Boomerang
contract) are simulated by a uniform delay from 50 ms to 150 ms. Note that PC balances are
only discovered implicitely through failed/successful TX attempts, similar to the current
state of affairs in Lightning.
The software is written in Golang 1.12.7. Every node is an independent process on a ma-
chine with 4x AMD Opteron 6378 processors (total 64 cores). The scenario is chosen such
that the CPUs are never fully utilized to avoid distortion from computational limitations.
The nodes communicate via ‘localhost’.
5.2. Three Simple Routing Protocols
We compare three multi-path routing protocols (pseudo code given in SectionD). ‘Retry’
(cf. Alg. 2) initially attempts v TXs and reattempts up to u of them. ‘Redundancy’
3 The source code is available on: https://github.com/tse-group/boomerang
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Figure 10: (a) Average success throughput per node, (b) Average time-to-completion for
successful TFs, (c) Average volume for successful TFs.
(cf. Alg. 3) attempts v + u TXs from the start. ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ (cf. Alg. 4) is a
combination of the two, which starts out with v + min(u, 10) TXs and reattempts up to
u −min(u, 10) of them. The aim is to trade off the lower TTC of ‘Redundancy’ with the
adaptivity of ‘Retry’. TXs are routed on paths chosen randomly from a set of precomputed
edge-disjoint shortest paths. All three schemes use atomic multi-path (AMP, [23]), i.e.,
they only Execute once enough successful TX attempts have been made to satisfy the
full TF (cf. Alg. 1). If the TF cannot be fully satisfied, all TXs are Rollbacked.
The baseline protocol ‘Retry’ is rather simplistic compared to recent developments [27,
28, 18, 29, 13, 32, 7, 33]. We choose it because it resembles what currently can and is being
done on Lightning. We conjecture that redundancy as a generic technique can boost AMP
routing algorithms across the board.
5.3. Simulation Results
Our results are shown in Fig. 10. Supplemental plots can be found in SectionE. Previous
works have gauged the performance of PN routing algorithms in terms of success volume
or success count, i.e., for a given trace of TFs, what total amount or number of TFs gets
satisfied. However, these metrics are problematic. If TFs are spread out in time then more
liquidity is available in the PN. This renders it easier to satisfy a TF and inflates these
metrics.
Instead, we consider success throughput, i.e., total amount of successfully transferred
funds per runtime. The results for v = 25 are shown in Fig. 10(a) (cf. Fig. 12(a)). ‘Redun-
dancy’ and ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ show a 2x increase in throughput compared to ‘Retry’.
Another relevant figure of merit is the average time-to-completion (TTC) of a suc-
cessful TF, i.e., how long is the delay between when the execution of a TF starts and
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when AMP is finalized. This determines the latency experienced by the user and for how
long liquidity is tied up in pending AMP TFs. The results for v = 25 in Fig. 10(b) (cf.
Fig. 12(b)) show a 40 % reduction in TTC for ‘Redundancy’ over ‘Retry’. The larger u, the
longer ‘Retry’ takes but the quicker ‘Redundancy’ completes. This plot also demonstrates
how ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ trades off between ‘Retry’ and ‘Redundancy’. For u ≤ 10,
‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ is identical with ‘Redundancy’ and hence follows the performance
improvement of ‘Redundancy’. For u > 10, the retry aspect weighs in more and more and
‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ follows a similar trajectory as ‘Retry’.
Finally, Fig. 10(c) (cf. Fig. 12(c)) shows the average size of a successful TF, where
‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ outperforms ‘Redundancy’ by 30 % which in turn outperforms ‘Retry’
by 40 %. Note that the throughput of ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ and ‘Redundancy’ are com-
parable. Thus, weighting between adaptively retrying and upfront redundancy trades off
TTC and average successful TF volume, at a constant throughput.
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A. Cryptographic Preliminaries
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q ≥ 22λ with a generator g ∈ G,
where λ is a security parameter. Let H : Zq → G with H(x) , gx, where Zq is the finite
field of size q (i.e., integers modulo q). We require that H be difficult to invert, which is
formalized in the following two definitions:
Definition 1 (Negligible Function). A function ε : N→ R+ is negligible if
∀c > 0: ∃k0 : ∀k > k0 : ε(k) < 1
kc
. (8)
In other words, negligible is what decays faster than every polynomial.
Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption). Given a generator g of a group G,
and an x R←− Zq chosen uniformly at random in Zq, for every probabilistic polynomial time
(with respect to λ) algorithm ADL,
Pr[ADL(g, gx) = x] = ε(λ). (9)
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is said to be hard for generator g in group G,
if the DL assumption holds for g and G, i.e., no computationally bounded adversary can
compute logg(gx) with non-negligible probability. It is commonly assumed that the DLP
is hard in certain elliptic curves (ECs), which are hence widely used in cryptographic
applications, e.g., in Bitcoin. The DL assumption makes H a one-way function.
B. Implementation of Boomerang Contract in Bitcoin Script via
Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication
See Figs 8 and 11 for Bitcoin Script implementations of Fig. 5.
C. Background on Adaptor Signatures
We briefly summarize Schnorr signatures [19]. Let H˜ be a cryptographic hash function
(modeled as a random oracle), and x‖y denote the concatenation of x and y. We continue
to assume that G is a multiplicative group with group operation ‘·’. For Schnorr signatures,
every identity is composed of a secret key x and a public key P , gx. To sign a message m,
draw r R←− Zq, then compute R , gr and s = r+H˜(P‖R‖m)x. The signature is σ , (s,R).
To verify a signature σ , (s,R) for m by P , check
gs
?= R · P H˜(P‖R‖m). (10)
An adaptor signature σ′ has the property that given σ′, knowledge of a proper signature σ
is equivalent to knowledge of a precommitted value t [26]. Consider parties P1 and P2 with
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Bitcoin Script implementation of output on TXsettle:
1 IF
2 ECEXP〈g〉 PUSH〈H(pi)〉 EQUALVERIFY
3 PUSH〈pkP2〉 CHECKSIGVERIFY
4 ELSE
5 PUSH〈T0 + ∆fwd〉 CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP
6 PUSH〈pkP1〉 CHECKSIGVERIFY
7 ENDIF
Redemption for P1 (‘no’ branch):
1 sigP1(TXpayout,P1)
2 FALSE
Redemption for P2 (‘yes’ branch):
1 sigP2(TXpayout,P2)
2 pˆi
3 TRUE
Figure 11: Bitcoin Script implementation of the output concerning δ TX fee (cf. Fig. 5(b)),
and witness stacks for redemption in favor of P1 and P2, respectively: l. 2
enforces revelation of pˆi such that H(pˆi) = H(pi), l. 3 requires a signature of
P2, l. 5 enforces the timelock until T0 + ∆fwd, l. 6 requires a signature of P1.
secret keys xi and public keys Pi , gxi . Both know a commitment T , gt to a (potentially
unknown) value t. To create an adaptor signature σ′ for m, both draw ri R←− Zq, compute
Ri , gri , and exchange (Pi, Ri). Then, they compute and exchange
s′i = ri + H˜(P1 · P2‖R1 ·R2 · T‖m)xi. (11)
The adaptor signature is σ′ = (R1 · R2 · T, s′1 + s′2). If either Pi gets to know t, they can
produce a valid total signature σ = (R1 ·R2 · T, s′1 + s′2 + t). Vice versa, if either Pi learns
a valid total signature σ = (R1 ·R2 · T, s), they can compute t = s− s′1 − s′2. For instance,
suppose m is a transaction that benefits P2 and requires a signature from P1 ·P2 with nonce
R1 ·R2 ·T . Furthermore, suppose P2 obtains t. Then it can use the adaptor signature σ′ to
produce a valid total signature σ and claim its funds. In this case, P1 can recover t from
σ and σ′.
D. Pseudo Code of Evaluated Routing Schemes
See Algs 1, 2, 3 and 4.
E. Supplemental Plots for Experimental Evaluation
For a more detailed version of Fig. 10, see Fig. 12.
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Algorithm 1 Finalize AMP TF
1: procedure FinalizeAMP(O,P, v) . Aborts outstanding TX attempts O,
Executes/Rollbacks successful TXs P depending on number of required TXs v
2: SendAbort(O)
3: if |P| = v then
4: SendExecute(P)
5: else
6: SendRollback(P)
7: end if
8: ReceiveReserveResponsesAndSendRollback(O)
9: end procedure
Algorithm 2 ‘Retry’ routing scheme
1: procedure Retry(T , v, u) . Split each TF t ∈ T into v TXs and retry u TXs
2: for t ∈ T do . Source t.s, destination t.d, amount t.v
3: O,P,N ← ∅, ∅, ∅ . TX attempts: outstanding O, successful P, failed N
4: u′ ← u . Unused TX retries
5: for i = 1, . . . , v do . Attempt v TXs
6: O ← O ∪ SendReserve(RandomPath(t.s, t.d), t.v/v)
7: end for
8: while |P| < v ∧ |O| > 0 ∧ |P|+ |O|+ u′ ≥ v do . TF is contingent
9: ReceiveAndClassifyReserveResponses(O,P,N )
10: for new elements r ∈ N do
11: SendRollback(r)
12: if u′ > 0 then
13: O ← O ∪ SendReserve(RandomPath(t.s, t.d), t.v/v)
14: u′ ← u′ − 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: end while
18: FinalizeAMP(O,P, v)
19: end for
20: end procedure
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Algorithm 3 ‘Redundancy’ routing scheme
1: procedure Redundancy(T , v, u) . Split TFs t ∈ T into v plus u redundant TXs
2: for t ∈ T do . Source t.s, destination t.d, amount t.v
3: O,P,N ← ∅, ∅, ∅ . TX attempts: outstanding O, successful P, failed N
4: for i = 1, . . . , v + u do . Attempt v TXs
5: O ← O ∪ SendReserve(RandomPath(t.s, t.d), t.v/v)
6: end for
7: while |P| < v ∧ |O| > 0 ∧ |P|+ |O| ≥ v do . TF is contingent
8: ReceiveAndClassifyReserveResponses(O,P,N )
9: for new elements r ∈ N do
10: SendRollback(r)
11: end for
12: end while
13: FinalizeAMP(O,P, v)
14: end for
15: end procedure
Algorithm 4 ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ routing scheme
1: procedure RedundantRetry(T , v, u, 10)
2: for t ∈ T do . Source t.s, destination t.d, amount t.v
3: O,P,N ← ∅, ∅, ∅ . TX attempts: outstanding O, successful P, failed N
4: u′ ← u−min(u, 10) . Unused TX retries
5: for i = 1, . . . , v + min(u, 10) do . Attempt v + min(u, 10) TXs
6: O ← O ∪ SendReserve(RandomPath(t.s, t.d), t.v/v)
7: end for
8: while |P| < v ∧ |O| > 0 ∧ |P|+ |O|+ u′ ≥ v do . TF is contingent
9: ReceiveAndClassifyReserveResponses(O,P,N )
10: for new elements r ∈ N do
11: SendRollback(r)
12: if u′ > 0 then
13: O ← O ∪ SendReserve(RandomPath(t.s, t.d), t.v/v)
14: u′ ← u′ − 1
15: end if
16: end for
17: end while
18: FinalizeAMP(O,P, v)
19: end for
20: end procedure
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(a) ‘Redundancy’ and ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ show a 2x increase in throughput compared to ‘Retry’.
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(b) ‘Redundancy’ shows a 40 % reduction in TTC over ‘Retry’. ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ interpolates
in TTC between ‘Retry’ and ‘Redundancy’.
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(c) ‘Redundant-Retry(10)’ satisfies 30 % larger TFs than ‘Redundancy’ which in turn satisfies 40 %
larger TFs than the ‘Retry’ baseline.
Figure 12: Performance as a function of maximum number of additional TXs (u)
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